Archive for Shiites

Happy Holidays from Baghdad!

Posted in Current Events in Iraq, Getting out of Iraq, Iraq and Troop Levels, Iraq War with tags , , , , , , , , , , , on December 22, 2011 by whatafteriraq

Depressingly, it has not taken long for things to begin to show signs of unravelling in Iraq. Less than a week after the last American combat vehicle passed the frontier into Kuwait, the first crisis has emerged. It is no surprise that things are coming undone, of course; this blog has been part of a chorus for some time arguing that things would turn bad in that country after the United States and regardless of when the United States leaves. The only surprise is how fast the fissures have reopened; one would have hoped the partisans would at least have waited until after the eggnog was drunk and the presents under the tree opened. But that clearly was not meant to be.

The source of the fissure has been the newest dispute between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s regime and the highest elected Sunni in the country,Tariq al-Hashemi, head of the al-Iraqiya party. The focus of the dispute is Shiite accusations that Hashemi and his associates engineered the murders of numerous Shiites, a charge that Hashemi says are both false and politically motivated, arguing that in making these accusations Maliki “pushes things in the direction of no return.” Not trusting the police and courts in Baghdad, Hashemi has taken refuge in Kurdistan, which has offered him effective asylum and which he uses as a platform from which to excoriate the Maliki government. His basic argument is that the charges are politically motivated, untrue, and that he could not receive a fair trial in Baghdad with its pro-Shiite, pro-Maliki courts that do not, in his words, offer adequate “transparency.”

This dispute highlights two of the most basic sources of division in Iraq that many of us have argued since before the 2003 invasion provided more than adequate reason not to invade in the first place. The heart of the disagreement is an entirely predictable confrontation between Sunnis and Shiites, the basic religious divide in Islam. The net effect of 8 1/2 years of American involvement in Iraq has been to shift power from a tyrannical Sunni dictator to what is increasingly looking like a Shiite dictator–an absolutely predictable outcome of our insistence on one-man,one-vote “democracy” is a country that is over 60 percent Shiite. Now that whatever restraint our presence had on the competition has been removed, the Sunnis and Shiites are fighting again. What a surprise!

The other dimension is territorial, the division between the Kurdish north and the rest of Iraq along ethnic and territorial lines. Although supporters of the war were always loath to admit it, Iraqi Kurdistan has been a de facto independent states for several years now, with very little Baghdad jurisdiction over what goes on there. The fact that Hashemi would seek refuge in Kurdistan and that the government would feel the need to negotiate about the Kurds turning him over rather than simply arresting him in what is, after all, officially part of Iraq tells you everything you need to know about the territorial integrity of the country. Until some agreement is reached on the division of oil revenues in the country, this status quo will continue. It is probably true that the only reason Kurdistan has not declared formal independence is strong opposition from surrounding countries with contiguous Kurdish minorities who would probably move to join such a state. Turkey, with the area’s largest and most formidable armed forces heads the lists of opponents which could, unlike the government in Baghdad, establish its sway over the Kurdish region if adequately incited to do so.

All this is playing out without great notice in the United States. The crisis emerging over the holiday season probably explains part of this–as most of us are more concerned about old Saint Nick than we are about Iraq. Indeed, the Obama administration may have made sure all the troops were out before Christmas because it knew things would blow up and wanted that to occur when we were not paying attention.

The only American politician who seems to have noticed is John McCain, whose response has been entirely predictable, arguing that the fault lies with the Obama administration for removing all the troops when it did. His argument, which he seems to apply most everywhere, is that if we kept a military presence in Iraq, it would not be blowing up today. The same argument was used in Vietnam, but misses the point that regardless of how long we stay, the divisions are going to remain and will boil over whenever our departure occurs. The Iraqis, on the other hand, realize that now that we are gone, we are not coming back, so they can revert to form.

Anyone who can make a straight line projection of the current dust up to the final outcome in Iraq has either been drinking too much eggnog or eggnog spiked with illegal substances. The current brouhaha is, more likely, simply the opening chorus of a much longer and more traumatic outcome, the exact nature of which is impossible to predict. What is safe to suggest is that it will not work out the way that George Bush, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, et. al. predicted back in the early summer of 2003.

Merry Baghdad to all, and to all a good night!


Iraq’s Wider Refugee Problem

Posted in Getting out of Iraq, Leaving Iraq, Morality of War with tags , , , , , , , , , on May 22, 2008 by whatafteriraq

The Council on Foreign Relations ( posted an article today (May 22, 2008) reminding us all that the Iraq War has created a far larger refugee problem than that associated with collaborators with the American occupation reported in Monday’s entry in this space (“America’s Iraqi Quisling Problem”). The article was written by Greg Bruno and is titled “A Long Road for Iraqi Refugees.” It is yet another depressing reminder of how badly the United States has served Iraq and its people in this war.

According to the article, there are currently over five million Iraqi refugees (about one-fifth of the total population) in either internal or external exile. Those in external exile are located in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, all countries with abundant problems of their own who do not need the added pressures of an indigent exile population. Iraqis who have collaborated with the United States and fled retribution by their fellow countrymen are part of this mass, but they are by no means all of it. Although the story concentrates on the paucity of international support for the refugees rather than their composition, most of them are Sunnis who fear retribution from the Shiite majority whose power is being implicitly supported by the American insistence on democratic governance (one man, one vote) in Iraq.

Given the deep rifts within Iraqi society, a large refugee outpouring was a predictable outcome of an effort to redo the Iraqi polity but, one more time, it appears to be a problem the Bush administration either did not anticipate or has chosen to ignore. Bruno, for instance, quotes Philadelphia Inquirer columnist Trudy Rubin on their response. “On the subject of Iraqi refugees,” she writes, “there is a deafening silence from the White House.”

In a sense, the American presence in Iraq has just traded one refugee problem for another. Under Sunni-dominated Baathist rule (Saddam Hussein), Shiites were regularly suppressed, and their leaders sought refuge wherever they could find it. Most went east to Iran to be with their co-religionists, just as Sunnis have fled to Sunni-dominated countries. There are, however, two differences worth noting. One is the sheer volume of refugees this time. I do not know the size of the Shiite refugee population under Hussein (does anyone out there?), but it was smaller. Second, the Sunni exodus also represents both a brain drain and loss of financial resources, since Sunnis occupied a disporportionate place in the upper reaches of Iraqi society and particularly were overrepresented in the professional classes. Their exodus is not entirely unlike the flight of the Palestinians after 1948 out of Palestine into bordering countries.

There is essentially no short-term positive prognosis for the refugee problem. Akin to the problem of those who assisted the American occupation, Uncle Sam does not appear forthcoming with either sizable financial or other assistance. If the refugees go home, they face the wrath of a Shiite government supported by the United States. If they try to stay where they are, the United States will be of limited assistance, particularly with the Syrians, with whom the United States refuses to talk at high levels of intergovernmental interchange. Presumably, the hope is that the problem will remain below the public radar until the administration leaves office (thereby kicking the can down the road to its successor). As well, the administration may be trying to help Senator McCain by not bringing attention to an embarassing aspect of a continuing presence in Iraq.

In the meantime, displaced Iraqis suffer, and no one seems to care much. But then, the war was supposed to have been over almost five years ago and, as I recall, the word “refugees” never appeared in the pre-war scenarios.