The Asymmetrical AFPAK Summit

President Obama met in Washington met this past week in Washington with President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan to discuss their common interests in suppressing the insurgency along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and, more specifically, aimed at eliminating either or both of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The meeting ended with a pronouncement by Obama that the three had reached common agreement on the need to deal with their common menace and to devise and implement that common accord. In a scene reminiscent of of Yasirt Arafat and Menachim Begin in the Rose Garden in the 1990s, the two foreign leaders exited the new conference virtually arm-in-arm. It was lovely theater.

It was not, however, such lovely geopolitics. While there was a great show of comity and common cause evinced in the atmospherics surrounding the AFPAK Summit (the term AFPAK appears to have originated with General David Petraeus to describe his regional strategy for dealing with the region), there is much more tension and disagreement there than met the eye. The basic source of that asymmetry is between the dictates of American interests and those of the other two countries, layered upon Afghan-Pakistani long-time rivalry, suspicion, and even hatred. Turning the summit into a successful action plan may, in fact, resemble efforts forty years ago in Southeast Asia, where a similar asymmetry of objectives existed.

For one thing, the players do have distinctly different interests in what happens in the tribal regions on both sides of the border. For the United States, the interest is in depriving Al Qaeda of its current sanctuary inside Pakistan in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area), and in an extension familiar from 2001, the prerequisite seems to be breaking Taliban control, since Al Qaeda in imbedded in the Pashtun regions which are also the breeding grounds of the Taliban. Since the Taliban (and other Pashtuns) ignore the Durand Line that is the boundary between the two countries, this can only be accomplished by simultaneously defeating the Taliban on both sides of the border (attack them on one side, and they simply move to the other). This translates into an overriding desire for a coordinated strategy whereby both Pakistan and Afghanistan move against the Taliban–with American assistance–preferably squeezing them along the border area in a kind of anvil and hammer strategem. It is such a commitment that the U.S. sought from Karzai and Zardari and what they at least rhetorically commited themselves to doing.

It is not as easy as that in fact for either country. The Afghan government would like to eliminate the Taliban, of course, since they are the major threat to their existence, but they face two problems. One is that they lack the military muscle to do so, and thus must rely on the Americans for that (which, of course, demonstrates their weakness and makes them appear American puppets to many Afghans). Second, they can only succeed by separating the Taliban from the rest of their Pashtun base, since the Pashtun are a near-majority in Afghanistan. The effort, in other words, must be viewed by Pashtuns as anti-Taliban but not anti-Pashtun if it is to succeed, and the Afghans have no real clue how to do that (neither do the Americans).

The Pakistani problem is somewhat more complicated. The Taliban,whom Zardari now says must be eliminated were, after all, basically created by the Pakistanis to cause trouble for the Afghans, and now their proteges have turned on them. The Pashtun are the largest minority in Pakistan at about 15 percent of the population, and their relationship with the central, Punjabi-based government has always been based on essential autonomy within their tribal regions: they do not bother the government, and it leaves them alone. What has changed is the increased militancy of the Taliban (trying to institute sharia law, for instance) and the demands of the Americans to root out Al Qaeda. The recent attacks in the Swat Valley by the Taliban simply amplify this problem but also demonstrate the other part of the Pakistani dilemma.

The other problem is military. Although Pakistan has the world’s seventh largest army, it is one designed to fight a conventional war against India on the plains, not a counter-insurgent war in trhe rough mountains of the tribal region. The Pakistanis have historically proven themselves inept at insurgency warfare, and they are likely to do so again in the current counter-offensive. This campaign, which pleases the Americans, of course, is likely to be embarassing to the Pakistani army, and given the penchant of the Pakistani military to involve itself in politics, that is not good news for Zardari.In this case, U.S. interests work at cross-purposes: the U.S. wants democracy to take hold in Pakistan, which would seem to dictate making nice to the military (which means not forcing them into more insurgent warfare), but it also wants increased military pressure put on the Taliban, which means antagonizing the Pakistani military, which is already none too fond of Zardari. Something has to give here.

All this drama takes place with a backdrop of long-standing tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan that is part of the historical accident that those two political entities occupy the territory between Russia and India. Both are artificial states that, if allowed self-determination, would almost certainly crumble into a number of smaller “Stans”, and they continue to exist partly by trying to weaken the other as part of their strategy of survival. Moreover, both are terribly poor and corrupt, making reform efforts problematical at best.

This analysis does not resemble the smiley faced photo op at the White House last week. But the simple fact is this may be a mission impossible. The memlory of Laos and Cambodia in 1970 keeps drifting into my mind: in that case, U.S. policy dictated changing the status quo in those countries to keep them from being launching pads by the North Vietnamese into South Vietnam. Actualizing that policy created dynamics in both country that were disastrous both for those countries (the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and a communist dictatorship in Laos) and for U.S. policy: the result was the worst of all possible worlds. Are we doing that again in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Maybe/hopefully not, but the possibility is there and cannot be ignored!

Is Afghanistan Obama’s Iraq?

This is, of course, an unpleasant question whose timing may appear to be trying to rain on the inaugural parade, but it must be asked anyway. The immediate impetus for so doing is the interview that Admiral Michael Mullen, the current (and 17th) Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff had with the news magazine show “60 Minutes” last night, in which the prospect was broached.

Admiral Mullen was asked to summarize the situation in Afghanistan. He repeated his assertion that currently the United States is losing the conflict, a position he has previously taken publicly. When asked if the addition of 30,000 additional American troops would change the situation and help lead to “victory” (carefully undefined), his response was equivocal. On one hand, he said the additions would help, but he did not go so far as to say the added troops (60,000 Americans total added to about 30,000 from other NATO countries) would be decisive. He DID say, however, that they would not be decisive unless the pipeline that was producing additional enemy combatants in Pakistan was not cut off. If that flow is not stopped, he suggested additional forces could not succeed; if the flow is stopped, they might succeed. No guarantees.

This assessment should give pause to incoming President Obama and the advisors who are asking him to adopt the war. Obama himself has made a public record of support for the effort in arguing that Afghanistan is more important than Iraq (arguably true) and that the failure to be successful in Afghanistan is the result of diverting resources from Afghanistan to Iraq. That assertion is no more than partially true. Making Afghanistan the second fiddle certainly has kept the United States from a maximum effort there. At the same time, that neglect may have kept the U.S. from overcommitting to an unwinnable quagmire in Afghanistan that added American forces may create anyway.

There are at least three reasons for a pessimistic assessment, two of which have already been raised in this space. One is the question of scale. After the new deployment, there will be about 90,000 foreign forces in Afghanistan. During the 1980s, the Soviets had over 150,000 forces there, and they failed to pacify a defiant country. How many would it take? Presumably a very large number–more than the U.S. or its allies is likely to commit.

Second, it is not clear that the U.S. can prevail under any circumstances. The Afghans, after all, are very good at repelling foreign invaders. In fact, it may the one thing they are very excellent at, as the British and Russians have most recently learned from direct experience. One of the major purposes of education, it is said, is to learn vicariously rather than directly from the lessons and mistakes of others. Is the United States so ineducable that it must learn this painful lesson on its own? Will Obama be the victim of this process?

Third, Mullen’s assessment suggests the key to having a chance in Afghanistan is to shut off the flow of troops trained in Pakistan. Who is going to do the dual tasks–shutting down training facilities and rounding up the troops they produce–implied? The Pakistan military almost certainly cannot do so. If required to, they will fail, and the result will be political turmoil: rebellion in the FATA among the Pashtuns who live there, and discontent in the rest of Pakistan over the army’s failure. The Army, in addition, is unlikely to be very enthused about being forced into a mission for which it knows it is ill-suited. If the Paks can’t do the job, who will? Will the United States have to invade? Now there is a truly scary prospect.

What this says, if one takes Mullen at his word, is that the only way possibly–but just possibly–to materially improve the situation in Afghanistan is to make the situation measurably worse in Pakistan. Which country is more important to the U.S., Afghanistan or Pakistan? Clearly, the answer is not Afghanistan. Hasn’t someone who whispers to the new president not pointed this out? If not, President Obama is, to revive an old phrase, “cruisin’ for a bruisin’.”

The Obama ascendancy is being viewed by many (myself included) with great hope and enthusiasm. Afghanistan, however, represents a very large and dark cloud hanging over the parade. The last thing that the new president wants–or should want–is for Afghanistan to become “Mr. Obama’s War.” Instead of stoking the fires with more troops, the new Obama team should be looking for ways to disengage militarily from Afghanistan, not seeing how to deepen an unwinnable conflict. That effort should be accompanied by an increasingly furtive drive to negotiate withe the parties, which means the less radical elements of the Pashtuns and Taliban, to find a modus vivendi with which the United States can live: an Afghanistan that does not harbor Al Qaeda but which decides for itself who and how it will be ruled. That is the most that the United States can realistically hope for in this situation, and it is not an outcome that can be delivered by the American military. No matter how hard and well the military tries, all it can do is to produce in Afghanistan another Iraq with Obama’s name on it.

Why Mumbai?

Now that the terrorist attack on Mumbai (Bombay), India, has officially been declared over, questions will now be raised about why it occurred where it did, and what the episode means for the continuing campaign against international terrorism. Particularly to answer the latter question, the place to start is, Why Mumbai?

Although officials from the terrorism community either do not know for certain or are not sharing what they do know publicly, it appears that the terrorist group responsible for this large, well coordinated, even “sophisticated” act of barbarism probably came from Pakistan. The leading candidates seem to be Kashmir-based, an indication that the somewhat dormant competition for the control of Jammu and Kashmir has not disappeared. The New York Times lists a number of candidate organizations of Muslims opposed to the continuing status of Kashmir as an Indian state as the possible perpetrators; all the candidate organizations are essentially unknown in the West, and even in the terrorism community. What they suggest is that the status of Kashmir is still on the table, and if that is the motivation, the spectacular nature of the attacks is slightly reminiscent of the airline hijackings of the early 1970s that made the world aware of the plight of the Palestinians. In those instances, the targets prominently included Europeans and Americans, who were apparently the targets in the major hotels in Mumbai that were attacked.

If Kashmir (or even possibly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas–FATA) were the source of the attacks, what does that tell us. One thing is that Indian-Pakistani relations, which have warmed in recent years, are a target–militants see Pakistan’s sidling up to India as selling out their militant causes. Targeting westerners suggests that the militants view Americans and Brits in particular as underlying causes of their misery. Attacking Mumbai, one of the leading beacons of India’s entrance into the world economy, suggests some symbolism in terms of rejecting westernization and secularization–recurrent themes in religious terrorism–as well.

If there is a silver lining in all this, it is that Al Qaeda has not been centrally implicated in the violence. It has been suggested that some of the terrorists may have been trained in Afghanistan by Al Qaeda in the 1990s, but the distinctive fingerprints of an Al Qaeda operation seem to be missing. Moreover, the fact that the terrorists chose to attack Americans in Mumbai rather than closer to home suggests that while they may be sophisticated at their deadly craft, they have limited reach beyond their apparent Pakistani sanctuaries.

If there is truly bad news associated with the attack, it may be what it says about Pakistan. Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan, may now be the terrorist capital of the world, and there is little indication the Pakistani government has any capability to deal with the problem and that any attempt to pressure them into an effective response might only display their fragility and make a bad situation of governmental instability worse. Does one need to be reminded that an unstable Pakistan with nuclear weapons is a very scary prospect? Moreover, it is not clear what anyone, particularly the United States, can do to change the situation. An Afghanistan-like response is simply not feasible–Pakistan is too big and too nuclear-armed to send in the cavalry.

Why Mumbai? may prove to be like the Churchillian analogy between Russia and the onion. The more layers that are peeled away, the more are revealed. The answer may lie across the border in Pakistan, and that is a very real problem for the United States and the rest of the world.

The Pashtuns and the Two Wars in Afghanistan

Regardless of whether one is talking about the American effort as primarily aimed at snuffing out Al Qaeda or as an effort to enhance Afghanistan’s security by decimating the resurgent Taliban and developing the country, there is one common effort: operationally, this is a war against the Pashtuns.

Most Americans have not heard of the Pashtuns (also known as Pushtoons, Pathans, and several other linguistic variations), and official statements of American policy, objectives, and plans to achieve them hardly (if ever) acknowledge the role of this ethnic and tribal group. Who are they, and why do we need to know?

The Pashtuns are the largest tribal group in Afghanistan. Before the Soviet invasion in 1979, they represented a majority of the population, but estimates are that upwards of 85 percent of the 6.2 million Afghans who fled the country were Pashtuns, and many found their way across the border into Pakistan, where the Pashtuns are the largest minority group and have found themselves at fairly constant odds with the Punjabi majority that has ruled the country virtually since independence in 1947 (an exception was rule by Ayub Khan, who was a Pashtun).

Currently, the Pashtun live in and dominate the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan and most of the tribal regions of Pakistan adjacent to the Afghan border (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of FATA, as noted in the last entry). These, of course, are the areas most under contention in the ongoing war being waged by the United States, its NATO allies, and the Afghan government on the Afghanistan side, and is the area where the United States has most encouraged the Pakistan government to assert an authority it has never actually possessed in the region. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that the Pashtun (and Afghans more generally) do not recognize as legitimate the boundary between the two countries, the so-called Durand Line named after the British official who drew it in 1897.

In these regions, the Pashtuns form the core of the resistance to the achievement of US policies goals (as best one can figure out what those are). The vast majority of support for and participation in the Taliban movement comes from the Pashtun (which was originally formed by Pashtun Talibs–religious students–studying at madrassas–religious schools–in Pakistan). The Pashtuns of Pakistan, moreover, have provided the safe haven for Al Qaeda, for reasons discussed below. Also, any planned American incursions into Paksitan would have to be initiated from Pashtun-controlled territory in Afghanistan into Pashtun-controlled areas of Pakistan. Thus, the Pashtun are the major focus of the US military action in Afghanistan, whether ackowledged or not.

It is important to understand this distinction, because it has operational implications that affect the prospects of the American military effort in the area and the long-term prospects of success. Part of these deal with the problem of dealing with the Pushtans as a group, and part of it has to do with the geopolitics of the region. It is unclear that current American efforts reflect either aspect.

The Pashtun are a very fiercely independent, traditional Sunni tribal group. Historically, they have also been decentralized, meaning that their actions are focused on small, autonomous organization, not any carefully organized and centralized movements. Operationally, the problem they create is captured in the Pakistan Handbook of 1998 (http://www.crossroadto/Quotes/Islam/Pashtun.html), which states, “They are fearless guerrillas who know the hills and valleys intimately, are crack shots and wear clothes (known as khakis, which means ’dusty’) that blend with their surroundings….No one has ever managed to subdue or unite them.”

The Pashtun code of behavior is relevent and is based on something known as the Pashtunwali (“Pashtun Way”). It has three basic values: honor, courage, and hospitality. Each helps explain why the United States faces a quandary confronting them.

The concept of courage gives the Pashtun their warrior spirit and makes them particularly difficult–possibly impossible–to subdue. The concept of honor includes, among other things the concept of badal (revenge), which impels a Pashtun to seek to violently redress acts of violence against his family or clan. US bombings of Pashtun villages and the deaths they inflict qualify as acts of violence requiring revenge. Finally, the concept of hospitality means that Pashtuns have an obligation to protect their guests from outsiders. The leadership of Al Qaeda, many of whom were part of the mujahadin that helped throw the Soviets out of Afghanistan, qualify as guests to be protected, which may help explain why Pashtun villagers in the FATA have not been cooperative in helping catch bin Laden and his band.

The present president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, is a former Pashtun warlord, but his presence has not translated into Pashtun support for his government, for several reasons. One is that Karzai has become part of the Kabul-based Afghan intellectual class, a group that is opposed by the relatively primitive, rural Pashtun majority. Part of the reason also is that the current government is heavily populated by ethnic Tajiks, whom the Pashtuns oppose. Finally, the Pashtuns join most Afghans in opposition to a strong central government, which Karzai and his American allies see as an important part of modernizing the country.

The Afghan problem is thus largely a Pashtun problem, and sensible American policy must take that reality into account. To make matters even a bit more complicated, there is also the matter of Pashtun nationalism and the repressed desire to create a place called Pashtunistan. More on that in the next entry.