Is Iraqification Succeeding?

In What After Iraq, I devote a chapter to Iraqification as the likely outcome of the Iraq War. The essence of the argument is that the outcome will resemble the process of Vietnamization (from which, obviously, the term is drawn). As it evolved, the policy of Vietnamization involved turning the war gradually over to the South Vietnamese with the “reasonable chance” they would be able to maintain their independence after the transfer of responsibility from American to South Vietnamese forces was completed.

There were really three dynamics to Vietnamization that have been transplanted to Iraq:

1, A recduction in acceptable outcomes from the American vantage point. In Vietnam, that meant backing down from a guarantee of Soth Vietnamese independence to the “reasonable chance” of that outcome.

2. The training and preparation of South Vietnamese forces to be robust enough to withstand a North Vietnamese onslaught.

3. The creation of conditions in surrounding countries to maximize the likelihood of South Vietnamese survival (notably sealing off Cambodia and Laos as infiltration routes).

Obviously, all this did not work out as planned in Vietnam, but it is clearly the basis of U.S. efforts in Iraq. The United States has backed away from the absolute goal of Iraqi democracy to the more measured standard of a stable government survival in which a democratic outcome is possible. The Iraqi armed forces have been recruited and trained, although that process is ongoing. Some efforts have been undertaken to neutralize influence from Syria and Iran, although those could hardly be called glowing successes (but then, neither were Cambodia and Laos successes).

Something like Iraqification is, after all, the only possible outcome. The United States will leave, and it requires some semblance of success behind it as it lowers the flag and departs. Although what will happen after we leave is still debatable, it is at least arguable that the situation will be stable. Sounds like Vietnamization to me!

The major forces seem to be aligning behind this outcome. Obama and McCain are, as argued in previous posts, “schlepping” their way toward the goal of full or large-scale withdrawal by 2010, and the al-Maliki government has embraced that outcome as well. Will it come as any surprise if the SOFA that is negotiated after January 2009 does not move in this direction as well?

Does the movement toward Iraqification favor one side or the other in the November election? No one, of course, uses the term, even if both have embraced its dynamics. Getting the U.S. out of Iraq certainly favors the Obama position, but McCain’s support for the surge will be trumpeted as having moved the situation to the point that Iraqification can be implemented. Sounds like a wash, although both candidates will doubtless take credit. If there is an advantage, it will be the direction the reasidual debate about Iraq will go. If it goes toward “how we won the war,” it will redound to McCain’s advantage (proof he knows how to “win wars”–despite never having won one); if it goes back to what we were doing there in the first place, the advantage goes to Obama.

In the end, Iraqification helps out everyone, by putting Iraq behind us. Then, the question will be how we treat Iraq once we’re gone. We forgot (arguably abandoned) Vietnam as fast as we could, and hardly noted it when the “reasonable chance” of success failed. Will we do the same things if events work out poorly after we leave Iraq?

Are U.S. Candidates Really Helping Israel?

With Barack Obama having completed his recent visit to Israel, donning the ritual yamulke to visit the Holocaust Memorial, pledging absolute support for Israeli security and issuing veiled threats against Iran (all acts performed earlier by John McCain), it may seem like a silly question. The obvious answer is that both candidates have demonstrated their commitment to Israel, which should reassure both the Israelis and their supporters in the United States. All that is left to debate is which candidate would be the most steadfast in support of Israel, which translates into who would tilt most toward Israel.

Therein lies the heart of the question posed in the title. The position that is implicitly supported by the candidates is that of the current Kadima government of Israel, an offshoot of the Likud party that shows its Likud roots more and more each day. If one assumes the Kadima/Likud position is good for Israel, then the candidates are helping Israel. But what if that position is actually hurting Israel?

Not all Israelis support the current Israeli regional stance, which consists of factual (if not rhetorical) hardlining toward the Palestinians. The most obvious evidence is the continuing growth of Israeli settlements on the West Bank territories that are supposed to be the basis of a Palestinian state in the two-state solution that is official Israeli policy. It is an absolute sham. There are now a quarter million Israelis living on the West Bank (closer to 400,000 if Jewish suburbs in East Jerusalem are included) in 140 settlements that are accessible by roads on which only Israelis can travel and which are patrolled (complete with checkpoints) by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). If left in place (and it is increasingly difficult to argue with a straight face the Israelis have any intention of undoing all this), the prospects for negotiating a peace agreement with the Palestinians on the basis of two states approaches zero. If one assumes that U.S. policy isnot identical to Israeli policy in the region and that a peace treaty with which the Muslims in the region are happy is in the American interest, then continuing to support–or not vigorously to oppose–the Israeli settlement policy (which neither candidate has done) is tantamout to opposing the American national interest. It may not serve Israeli interests either.

There are only three ways out of the current Israeli-Palestinian impasse. One is a continuation of the current Israeli occupation of the West Bank, including further expansion of Israeli settlements on the West Bank following the Likud preference for a “Greater Israel.” Nobody thinks that will work in the long run; at best, it settles none of the differences that separate the party;at worst, it simply allows things to fester.

A second solution is the two-state solution. As noted, this is official policy on everyone’s part: the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the Americans. The Israelis and Palesinians are divided on how the division of the West Bank occurs: the more that becomes part of Palestine, the happy the Palestinians are, and vice versa. The division of Jerusalem, which Obama has opposed but has backed slightly away from, is part of this controversy. It is the only solution that resolves the situation by separating the parties. It makes so much sense, however, that it is a diminishing possibility. Some Israelis who oppose the Kadima/Likud position believe the window is closing on this option, and that the settlements are what is slamming the window closed.

The last possibility, which becomes the only option to the status quo if the two-state solution dies, is a single Israeli-Palestinian state encompassing current Israel and the West Bank. It could take two forms. One is as a fully representative democracy. The problem with that is that the Jewish population of the combined state would be in a slight minority, and because the growth rate of the Palestinians is higher than that of the Israelis, that balance will tip progressively against the Jews. A fully democratic Israel/Palestine would not be a Jewish state. The other possibility is the one raised by Jimmy Carter: a combined state where the Israelis are fully participating citizens and the Palestinians are not. Carter had the audiacity to call such an outcome an “apartheid” state, which is politically incorrect but probably factually descriptive. If one thinksIsrael is a pariah state that is vigorously opposed by its opponents now, just imagine what this possibility could produce.

What all this suggests is that it is not at all clear that unfettered support for the current Israeli government is really in the interest of Israel or anyone else–other than the Likudniks and their dreams of a Jewish-controlled Israel that extends to the Jordan River (the entire West Bank incorporated into Israel). That solution may (apparently does) sound good to Benjamin Netanyahou, but it would arouse passions that certainly do not serve U.S. interests. Or, for that matter, sensible Israeli interests.

Election campaigns are not great places for getting at the detailed, complex nature of international problems. Sound bites of undying support for Israel sound good to an American electorate which does not know what that means, but those sound bites may disserve the interests of peace in the region. How about biting the bullet and suggesting a little tough love for he Israelis; for instance, conditioning our unconditional support on dismantling of all the Israeli settlements not directly contiguous to the pre-1967 borders of Israel? The candidate who might take such a position might even rise above the label of politician to that of statesman. Isn’t that what we want after eight years of decidedly unstatesmanlike behavior in the White House?

The SOFA and the Election

It was not supposed to work out this way. The Bush administration assumed that it was going to be able to tie the hands of its successor administration by negotiating a new Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) with the Iraqis that would, as noted in earlier posts, give the United States Iraqi acquiescence to a more or less indefinite stay by American forces on converted Iraqi bases all over the country and essentially immune from Iraqi legal or other jurisdiction. Along the way, the U.S. forces could even conceivably help make sure the Iraqis did not do anything untoward with their oil industry, like excluding American oil companies from the leases they will negotiate. A sweet deal that might allow achievement of Bush’s objectives in Iraq (whatever those are) and also mean that if Obama wins, he would have a hard time pulling out of the country.

But then the Bushies were outsmarted (hardly the first time that has happened). Their plans, of course, assumed the Iraqis would, Uncle Tom-like, accept what was clearly a much better deal if you are an American neo-con than if you are an Iraqi, To the absolute chagrin and apparent surprise of Americans from Bush to smiley Condy Rice, the Iraqis have said, “no thanks.” Since the agreement the U.S. seeks to extend is based in the expiration of a UN mandate, it is kind of hard to ignore. And al-Maliki and company know it. And so the administration is frantically backing and filling, acquiescing to the new realities while denying anything is new at all. Nice try guys!

What is rather clearly emerging from all this is a compromise that will affect the fall election. There will be no long-term SOFA on Bush’s watch; rather, there will be some sort of interim agreement that allows the Americans to remain beyond December 31 and for the new administration to get into the mix. The Iraqis have clearly learned about American lame ducks and would prefer to talk to the folks who will be in charge for the next four years rather than today’s caretakers. Now, the discussion has turned to timetables for American withdrawal. The Bush neo-cons, of course, refuse to use that particular “t-word”, so they are “time horizons,” but everyone knows what that means. But as if to twist the knife in George Bush’s back a little, al-Maliki said yesterday, as he was getting ready to go to the airport (figuratively, at least) to greet Obama landing in Baghdad, that he thought the Obama 16-month timetable sounded pretty good to him. John McCain cannot be happy with this turn of events.

Something like an agreement on the terms of the SOFA could turn the Iraq issue in the campaign. If al-Maliki embraces the Obama position during his visit, it is a tacit endorsement of Obama and rejection of McCain. Do the Iraqis have their own pollsters in the United States? If he continues to say that 16 months sounds like a pretty good timetable–er, time horizon–where does that leave McCain? Does he declare he thinks victory will be achieved in 16 months? By that time, Bush will be off cutting brush in Crawford and will probably not care. Obama, on the other hand, will have a hard time wipig the smile off his face.

Things can, of course, change. The SOFA problem will not go away, however, and the Bush administration has clearly shown it has no juice left to force, maybe even influence, the outcome. And so maybe the Iraqis will get to frame the major foreign policy issue of an American presidential campaign. The occupied dictating to the occupiers? Wow.

Dying on Afganistan’s Plains

Senator Obama is preparing to leave for his tour of Iraq. While this event will provide nothing of substantive value, it will at least allow him to quiet the charge that he has made policy pronouncements without having been there from the McCain camp.

This ia a curious charge and response. People make policy judgments all the time on matters with which they have little if any direct, experiential connection. Legislators cannot possibly immerse themselves in everything about which they will make judgments, and presidents are the same. So why does Obama need to go to Iraq? And even when he does, what is he going to learn? Is he going to see the situation as it actually exists, or as the US command wants it to look? And are the Iraqis (who, according to today’s New York Times story, pretty much like Obama) going to get to know Obama, who will be well surrounded by security people to keep those Iraqis away from him? What is takeaway supposed to be? Am I the only one who does not really get it about this trip?

The trip to Iraq is mostly fluff, but this week’s announcements from the Obama camp on Afghanistan (mirroring McCain) are not. Obama said that a main reason for getting the troops out of Iraq is so more will be available for Afghanistan (he has suggested an extra 10,000). The stated reason is better to track down bin Laden. Does this make sense?

There are currently 36,000 American troops in Afghanistan, plus assorted NATO forces. They are fighting, primarily at least, Taliban who melted away after 2001 but never really went away. What is now transpiring in Afghanistan is an Afghan reaction to yet another foreign invader, who happens to support a government in Kabul that it helped install. The connection, of course, is that the Taliban and Al Qaeda have close links; thus, a Taliban victory means a resurgent Al Qaeda, and a defeated Taliban leave Al Qaeda more vulnerable. Thus, an increased U.S. effort against the Taliban translates into progress against bin Laden and Company.

Will this all work? It depends on how the Afghanis see our presence. If they view the Taliban (who come from the largest tribe in the country, the Pashtun) as the enemy, they may support the US and its allies. If, on the other hand, they come to view our presence (especially if it becomes larger) as just the most recent foreign occupation, we are in trouble. Any reading of Afghan history does not offer solace to the invaders/occupiers. The British learned this a century and more ago; the Soviets nearly 30 years ago. Must we reinvent the wheel here? Or, might it be a better idea to adopt much more specific, limited goals to achieve in Affghanistan that can be accomplished without major US military presence on the ground. Or, are we going to drift into another open-ended military commitment that we do not understand, and can neither win nor figure out how to get extricated from?

As Senator Obama is flying to Iraq, I hope someone will give him a copy of the collected works of Rudyard Kipling. If they do, Senator, please turn to his poem “The Young British Soldier.” The last verse reads in part:

“When you’re wounded and left of Afghanistan’s plains,

And the women come out to cut up what remains,

Just roll to your rifle and blow out your brains,

And go to your Gawd like a soldier.”

Enough said.

Source: Sabrina Tavernise and Richard A. Oppel Jr. “In Iraq, Mixed Feeling About Obama and His Troop Proposal.” New York Times (online), July 17, 2008.

Bridge over Troubled–SOFA–Waters

It has become so commonplace for American politicians to ignore the lame duck Bush administration as to constitute a “dog bits man” story. When, however, the government of Iraq does the same thing, that’s news: “man bites dog.” And yet that is apparently what has happened over the ill-fated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to extend the American stay in Iraq past the December 31 withdrawal date set by the United Nations.

As reported in this space, the Bush administration has hoped to negotiate and sign a long-term presence in Iraq that would tie the hands of the next administration–much more of a bind for Obama than McCain. The Iraqis have been resisting these advances (much to the surprise and consternation of the Bush “brain” trust), and yesterday the hammer went down. As described in the Washington Post Sunday edition, there will be no long-term agreement between now and the new administration. Instead, negotiations will continue for a “bridge agreement” that will avoid the U.S. being unceremoniously thrown out as the ball drops in Times Square. The United States calls what is being sought a “temporary operating protocol”; the Iraqis call it a “memorandum of agreement” (MOU); the rest of us can call it a ringing defeat for the Bush administration.

As noted in earlier postings, the Iraqis have been troubled by various aspects of an extension of the occupation, and apparently the immunity of US troops from prosecution for alleged crimes has proven the sticking point; moreover, provincial elections are scheduled for the fall in Iraq, and no Iraqi politician wants to be associated with having expedited an open-ended US stay. So, they said “no deal; we’ll talk to the new adminstration.”

The bridge over troubled waters being discussed would likely carry through 2009, allowing the Obama or McCain administration to negotiate either a complete pullout or some more limited form of continued stay. At any rate, this is one instance where kicking the can down the road is usefully empowering for the recipient, since the new administration will not be stuck with a long-term albatross from which it can only extricate itself indelicately.

The administration has, of course, slapped lipstick on the pig as best it can. The Post quotes an unnamed adminstration official rationalizing the situation with a curiously mixed metaphor; the US will now negotiate “a bridge to have the authority in place so we don’t turn into a pumpkin on December 31.” George W. Bush himself could hardly have said it better!